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I. INTRODUCTION 
The president of a national organization advocating for more diverse 
role models in programming once joked, “[T]here actually have been 
studies showing there are more extraterrestrials on television than 
Latinos.”1 Although intended as a humorous representation of the lack of 
minorities in American media, the statement demonstrates the harsh reality 
that the media industry often ignores its minority audience. With the 
deregulation of media in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the unprecedented 
consolidation of American media has narrowed the ability of minority and 
nonminority audiences to obtain diverse programming.2 While the FCC has 
tried addressing this problem by promoting its policy of expanding 
minority ownership of the media,3 heavy deregulation in the last three 
decades has resulted in “Big Media” companies consolidating their 
ownership across media; this consolidation has “threatened [ ] localism, 
diversity, and competition[,]” and has led to a considerable downsizing of 
local reporters, editors, and DJs who cater to cities and towns across 
America.4  
In an age where the next great technological advancement is just five 
minutes away, one might think American society has access to a plethora of 
information to make us a better-informed public with programming that 
appeals to a variety of individuals within the American public. However, 
with a few Big Media companies controlling all facets of communication 
such as radio, television, cable, newspapers, and the Internet, we are 
reading and seeing recycled stories that cater to a majoritarian audience.5 In 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Gary Dretzka, Left out of the Picture: Young Women Prod TV Executives to 
Diversify Programs, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1996, at 1. 
 2. As shall be elaborated on in Part II, universally defining diversity in the media has 
been a major obstacle of this debate. For this Note, diversity means programming that is 
inclusive of entertainment and topics of importance to minority audiences. 
 3. See, e.g., Metro Brdcst., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 556–66 (1990) (noting that the 
FCC “pledged to consider minority ownership as one factor in comparative proceedings for 
new licenses[,]” it “outlined a plan to increase minority opportunities to receive reassigned 
and transferred licenses through the so-called ‘distress sale’ policy[,]” and it “selected the 
minority ownership policies primarily to promote programming diversity”). 
 4.  See ERIC KLINENBERG, FIGHTING FOR AIR: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL AMERICA’S 
MEDIA 26 (2007). “[J]ust as Starbucks knocked out independent coffee shops and Wal-Mart 
killed the corner store, media conglomerates have devastated locally produced newspapers, 
television stations, and radio programs throughout the country.” Id. at 14. 
 5.  See Robert B. Horwitz, On Media Concentration and the Diversity Question, in 
MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS 9, 18 (Philip M. Napoli ed., 2007) 
(stating that “[t]he concentration of media ownership has led to more controlled 
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order to progress as an inclusive society, we need diverse programming 
that exposes all audiences to different perspectives and not just to that of a 
nonminority demographic. Although there was hope that deregulating 
media ownership would result in an open communication marketplace that 
would optimize the number of viewpoints expressed in the media,6 market 
forces by themselves have not been able to achieve this “idealized 
marketplace of ideas.”7 
In order to obtain diversity in the media that is more reflective of our 
diverse population8 and that does not neglect the minority audience, the 
FCC needs to bring back regulation rather than allow markets to dictate 
what best serves the public interest. Although the current policy of the FCC 
to promote minority ownership of the media as a way to achieve more 
diverse programming is an important policy, it is a policy that has not been 
easily achieved and is traditionally criticized for a lack of empirical 
evidence demonstrating a nexus between minority ownership and diverse 
programming.9 The FCC should look beyond its focus on ownership 
regulation to regulations providing for diversified programming and 
lowering market control that dictates programming.  
                                                                                                                 
information, fewer and less diverse sources of information, and thus less ‘real’ information 
despite a purported information overload”).  
 6. See MARA EINSTEIN, MEDIA DIVERSITY: ECONOMICS, OWNERSHIP, AND THE FCC 1 
(2004). 
 7. Id. at 2.  
 8. News Release, U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Shows America’s Diversity (Mar. 
24, 2011), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-
cn125.html (“Between 2000 and 2010, the Hispanic population grew by 43 percent, rising 
from 35.3 million in 2000 to 50.5 million in 2010. . . . [and] compris[ing] 16 percent of the 
total U.S. population[;] . . . [t]he black or African-American population totaled 38.9 million 
and represented 13 percent of the total population[;] [a]pproximately 14.7 million people 
(about 5 percent of all respondents) identified their race as Asian alone[;] . . . Native 
Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone . . . represented 0.2 percent of the total 
population[;] [t]he remainder of respondents who reported only one race, 19.1 million 
people (6 percent of all respondents), were classified as ‘some other race’ alone[;] [and] 
[n]ine million people reported more than one race in the 2010 Census and made up about 3 
percent of the total population.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 355 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (stating that although the Supreme Court in Metro Brdcst., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 
(1990), found that Congress “produced adequate evidence of a nexus between minority 
ownership and programming that reflects a minority viewpoint . . . [the Court] never 
explained why it was in the government’s interest to encourage the notion that minorities 
have racially based views). The Lutheran Court stated, “We do not mean to suggest that 
race has no correlation with a person’s tastes or opinions. We doubt, however, that the 
Constitution permits the government to take account of racially based differences, much less 
encourage them.” Id.; see also Laurie Mason, Christine M. Bachen & Stephanie L. Craft, 
Support for FCC Minority Ownership Policy: How Broadcast Station Owner Race or 
Ethnicity Affects News and Public Affairs Programming Diversity, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 37, 
44 (noting that “social science research addressing the relationship between ownership and 
programming is neither voluminous nor consistent”). 
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This Note considers the current media ownership regulation scheme 
and provides possible solutions that will enhance programming that serves 
minority and nonminority audiences alike. Part II describes the historical 
development of diversity in the media through landmark cases, such as 
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,10 and 
the consolidating effects of the Telecommunications Act of 199611 and the 
FCC’s 2003 Report and Order,12 which yielded backlash from critics and 
the courts in Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal Communications 
Commission.13 Part III analyzes the present discontent with programming 
that lacks diverse perspectives in the media and the shortage of alternatives 
despite technological growth. It proposes that bringing back a regulatory 
approach will increase the availability of diverse programming that is 
inclusive of minority audiences more so than the current market approach 
regime we have seen for the past three decades. Part IV concludes that the 
FCC needs to bring back regulation that continues minority ownership 
policies and introduces standards that require broadcasters to ascertain the 
needs of the communities they serve so that advertisers are not the sole 
dictators of programming.  
II. HISTORY OF DIVERSITY AND CONSOLIDATION IN THE MEDIA 
A.  Early Notions and Development of Diversity  
In the Communications Act of 1934, Congress granted the FCC the 
authority to grant broadcasting licenses based on “public convenience, 
interest, or necessity.”14 Diversity has since been viewed as one of the goals 
of the FCC as it exercises its authority over regulating media because an 
essential component of serving the public interest “has meant providing a 
diversity of viewpoints through the broadcast spectrum.”15 A major 
obstacle in the diversity discussion has been the inability of policymakers, 
scholars, the courts, or content providers to develop a universal definition 
of diversity due to the fact that regulating content conflicts with the First 
Amendment.16 Therefore, policymakers often use “structural diversity, that 
is diversity of media ownership or diversity of producers,” as a way to 
                                                                                                                 
 10. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
 11. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202, 110 Stat. 56 
(codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 12. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review–Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
18 F.C.C.R. 13620 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Report and Order].  
 13. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2904 (2005). 
 14. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 303 (2006).  
 15. EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 9.  
 16. Id. at 6.  
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reach diversity in programming.17  
Diversity in the media has seen an evolution of different focuses 
based on the FCC’s media policy. Three general concepts of diversity often 
utilized by the FCC are product diversity (referring to different program 
types), source diversity (referring to the ownership structure), and 
viewpoint diversity (referring to different perspectives concerning 
important issues).18 Within traditional notions of source and viewpoint 
diversity, there has often been a concern about imposing the political and 
economic power of a single media owner onto the beliefs of voters.19 
Regardless of the number of characterizations of diversity, the main goal of 
diversity in the media is to provide more programming options containing 
multiple perspectives for all audiences to enjoy. 
Notions of diversity can be traced to the idea that communications 
media is a marketplace of ideas. In order to ensure that the marketplace of 
ideas flourishes in broadcast media, the government set ownership limits in 
its licensing process when granting broadcast frequencies to private 
parties.20 Early licensing schemes attempted to limit problems, such as the 
monopolization of local media through common ownership of broadcast 
and newspapers, in order to allow greater access to viewpoints.21 These 
principles were largely derived from the Fairness Doctrine.22  
The Fairness Doctrine was established in 1949 by the FCC23 in order 
to “codify the principle that broadcast media should offer a range of 
viewpoints to ensure that a scarcity of broadcast licenses would not result 
in a lack of diversity in the marketplace of ideas.”24 Two prongs that 
developed out of the FCC Report that came to be known as the Fairness 
Doctrine required broadcasters “to devote a significant amount of time to 
coverage of issues of public importance, and . . . to provide reasonably 
comparable exposure to significant contrasting viewpoints.”25 Although the 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. 
 18. Peter J. Alexander & Brendan M. Cunningham, Public and Private Decision 
Making: The Value of Diversity in News, in MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING 
AND METRICS, supra note 5, at 79, 81. 
 19. See id.  
 20. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 26.  
 21. Id.  
 22.  See David L. Bazelon, The First Amendment and the “New Media”—New 
Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 205 (1979) (“The 
most notorious vehicle for promoting diversity has been the fairness doctrine. The rationale 
behind the fairness doctrine was to limit the ability of a broadcaster to use his quasi-
monopoly position to promote only a single side of an important public issue.”). 
 23.  Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, Report, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). 
 24. JOSH SILVER & MARVIN AMMORI, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE DISTRACTION 3, 
http://www.freepress.net/files/fp-FairnessDoctrine.pdf. 
 25. Id.  
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Supreme Court upheld the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. Federal Communications Commission,26 the Fairness Doctrine was 
criticized because of concerns that it led to censorship.27  
In the early 1980s, the FCC, spearheaded by President Reagan’s 
appointee, Chairman Mark Fowler, reconsidered its position towards the 
Fairness Doctrine and it “urged Congress to repeal the Commission’s 
statutory authority to impose fairness obligations and equal time duties 
upon federal licensees.”28 Since Congress did not respond to the proposal, 
the FCC “initiated a comprehensive review of the Fairness Doctrine[,]” and 
by 1985 it released a report that questioned the necessity of the Fairness 
Doctrine, which signaled the FCC’s shift from a regulatory approach to a 
deregulatory market approach:29 
[W]e conclude that the fairness doctrine is no longer a necessary or 
appropriate means by which to effectuate [the public] interest. We 
believe that the interest of the public in viewpoint diversity is fully 
served by the multiplicity of voices in the marketplace today and that 
the intrusion by government into the content of programming 
occasioned by the enforcement of the doctrine unnecessarily restricts 
the journalistic freedom of broadcasters. Furthermore, we find that the 
fairness doctrine, in operation, actually inhibits the presentation of 
controversial issues of public importance to the detriment of the public 
and in degradation of the editorial prerogative of broadcast 
journalists.30 
Eventually in 1987, the Fairness Doctrine was repealed “after the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit remanded a Fairness Doctrine case to 
the [FCC.]”31 Although Congress attempted to reinstate the Fairness 
Doctrine, President Ronald Reagan vetoed the attempt, and the Fairness 
Doctrine has remained dead law.32  
                                                                                                                 
 26. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 27. See SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 5; see, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 22, at 
205–06 (discussing how the Fairness Doctrine has not promoted diversity and has 
essentially “plac[ed] a government editor in the programmer’s booth”); Inquiry into Section 
73.1910 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness 
Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, para. 1 (1985) 
(calling into question the Fairness Doctrine as having “an impermissible chilling effect on 
the free expression of ideas”) (internal quotation omitted) [hereinafter 1985 Fairness 
Report]. 
 28. R. Randall Rainey, The Public’s Interest in Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic 
Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the Public Interest Duties 
of the Electronic Media, 82 GEO. L.J. 269, 293–94 (1993). 
 29. Id. at 294–95.  
 30. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 27, at para. 5; see also EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 
23–24 (citing Enver Masud, Broadcasting Fairness Doctrine Promised Balanced Coverage, 
WISDOM FUND (July 25, 1997), http://www.twf.org/News/Y1997/Fairness.html). 
 31. See SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 3; Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr v. 
FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 502–03 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  
 32. SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 3.   
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Despite the rise and fall of the Fairness Doctrine, concerns for 
diversity in the media remained prominent and found growth in the 1960s 
during the civil rights era. A reform movement developed in the 1960s 
pushing the FCC to be more in tune with the public interest standard of the 
Communications Act of 1934 by encouraging broadcasters to air content 
that was important to minority audiences and to hire minorities to work at 
broadcast stations.33 The lack of minorities in ownership, programming, 
and broadcast employment was a catalyst for FCC regulations addressing 
diversity, such as ascertainment requirements that required “licensees to 
‘ascertain’ the communities to which they broadcast and to air 
programming relevant to these ascertained local community concerns.”34 In 
1960, the FCC adopted the Report and Statement of Policy Res: 
Commission en banc Programming Inquiry,35 which set fourteen criteria for 
broadcasters to use to determine the needs of the communities they served 
and how to develop programming that served those needs.36 These 
ascertainment requirements gave broadcasters a standard to follow to 
ensure they were serving the public interest.  
In 1973, the FCC began considering minority ownership as a factor in 
comparative hearings for broadcast license applications as a way to 
introduce more diversity into the media.37 Previously, the FCC considered 
race only if the licensing applicant could prove that his or her race would 
enhance diversity in programming.38 However, minority ownership was 
virtually nonexistent by 1971, with only ten out of approximately 7,500 
radio stations being minority-owned and none of the 1,000 television 
stations owned by minorities.39 Questions of minority ownership reached 
the courts in TV 9, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,40 in which 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the racial identity of an 
applicant for a radio license was relevant when choosing between 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 27.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Public Notice, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960). 
 36. The fourteen criteria listed in the 1960 Programming Policy Statement were the 
following: “(1) opportunity for local self-expression, (2) the development and use of local 
talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational programs, (6) 
public affairs programs, (7) editorialization by licensees, (8) political broadcasts, (9) 
agricultural programs, (1[0]) news programs[,] (11) weather and market reports, (12) sports 
programs, (13) service to minority groups, [and] (14) entertainment programs.” Id. at 2314; 
see also Carolyn M. Byerly, Professor, Dep’t of Journalism, JHJ Sch. of Comm., Howard 
Univ., Statement to Participants and Audience at Media Ownership Workshop on Diversity 
Issues: GenderandRaceConscious Research Toward Egalitarian Broadcast Ownership 
Regulation 2 (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/workshop-012710/byerly.pdf.  
 37. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 28.  
 38. Id.  
 39. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 937 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 40. Id. 
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applicants.41 With the court finding that minority ownership could result in 
more diverse programming, the FCC began giving “evaluation 
enhancement[s] in comparative hearings to minority ownership and 
participation in station management by members of minority groups.”42  
In 1978, the FCC further addressed diversity concerns through its 
Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities,43 
which provided for a minority tax certificate program44 and a distress sale 
program45 to encourage existing broadcast property to be sold to minorities. 
Despite more race-neutral measures to increase the opportunities of 
minorities in the equal employment context and with its community 
ascertainment requirements, the FCC felt that the views of minorities46 
were not adequately represented in broadcast media, which was a 
disservice to the interest of the minority audience and to that of the general 
public.47  
The FCC noted that having diversified programming was a key 
objective of the Communications Act of 1934 and of the First Amendment, 
and aside from serving the minority audience such programming “also 
enriches and educates the non-minority audience.”48 To assist in the 
diversification of the media, the FCC believed that minority ownership was 
the key to including minority viewpoints in programming.49 The FCC 
further noted that just because an applicant proposes to present the views of 
minority groups in their programming, it “does not offset the fact that it is 
upon ownership that public policy places primary reliance with respect to 
diversification of content, and that historically has proved to be 
significantly influential with respect to editorial comment and the 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. at 937; see also Horwitz, supra note 5, at 28.  
 42. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 28. 
 43. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, Public 
Notice, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Statement of Policy]. 
 44. Id. at 983; see also Christine M. Bachen et al., Serving the Public Interest: 
Broadcast News, Public Affairs Programming, and the Case for Minority Ownership, in 
MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS, supra note 5, at 269, 285 (“[T]he 
FCC awarded a certificate allowing capital gains taxes to be deferred when a broadcast or 
cable system owner elected to sell their license to minority owned or controlled entities or 
entrepreneurs.”). 
 45. 1978 Statement of Policy, supra note 43, at 983; see also Bachen et al., supra note 
44, at 284–85 (“[T]he FCC allowed a broadcast licensee that had been designated for 
hearing because of an issue that disqualified it from controlling a license, to sell its license 
to a minority owned firm to avoid the loss of value of the license.”). 
 46. The FCC defined minorities to include “those of Black, Hispanic Surnamed, 
American Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction.” 1978 
Statement of Policy, supra note 43, at 980 n.8.  
 47. Id. at 980–81.  
 48. Id. at 981.  
 49. Id. 
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presentation of news.”50 
While remaining cautious of not overstepping censorship of broadcast 
speech and the editorial function of a broadcast license, the FCC developed 
minority ownership policies in order to expand broadcast diversity.51 
Essentially, the FCC would give a “plus” to applicants that were at least in 
part minority owned or managed when awarding initial broadcast 
licenses.52 Ultimately, these FCC policies were legitimated based on the 
presumption that there was a “connection between ownership diversity and 
. . . program and viewpoint diversity.”53 As a result of FCC minority 
ownership policies, there was an increase of minority ownership in the 
approximately 12,000 radio and 1,200 television stations from around 1 % 
to 3.5 % in the years between 1978 to 1990.54 In addition, during this time 
the diversity rationale for increasing minority ownership received both 
judicial and congressional approval.55 
B.  Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission and the Following Stagnation of Minority Ownership 
Although there are different types of diversity, viewpoint diversity in 
programming seemed to be the aim of the ownership policies of the 
1970s.56 Since direct regulation of viewpoint diversity conflicts with 
anticensorship principles of the First Amendment and the Communications 
Act of the 1934, the FCC regulated ownership diversity as a way to 
indirectly regulate viewpoint diversity.57 However, questions about the 
indirect use of ownership diversity to reach viewpoint diversity surfaced in 
the courts and changed the direction of minority ownership policies.  
In 1990, the Supreme Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal 
Communications Commission58 addressed challenges of FCC policies 
regarding awarding enhancement for minority ownership in comparative 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 982 (quoting TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 937–38 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). 
 51. See Bachen et al., supra note 44, at 284–85. 
 52. Id. at 284. The FCC would consider six factors when comparing mutually exclusive 
new broadcast license applications: diversification of control of mass media 
communications, full-time participation in station operation by owners, proposed program 
service, past broadcast record, efficient use of the frequency, and the character of the 
applicants. See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Public Notice, 1 
F.C.C.2d 393, 394–99 (1965); W. Mich. Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601, 604–05, 615 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (arguing that minority ownership and participation is a “plus” factor to be 
considered with all other factors). 
 53. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 29.  
 54. Bachen et al., supra note 44, at 285.  
 55. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 30.  
 56. Id. at 29.  
 57. Id. at 30.  
 58. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
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hearings for new licenses and the minority distress sale program.59 Noting 
that the FCC’s minority ownership programs had been specifically 
approved and mandated by Congress60 and that an integral part of the 
FCC’s mission is to safeguard the public’s right to receive diverse views 
and information,61 the Court held: 
benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress—even if those 
measures are not “remedial” in the sense of being designed to 
compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination—
are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important 
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.62  
Under this intermediate scrutiny standard, the Court found that the minority 
ownership policies served an “important governmental objective of 
broadcast diversity” and that they were “substantially related to the 
achievement of that objective.”63  
The Court ultimately ruled that “[t]he FCC’s conclusion that there is 
an empirical nexus between minority ownership and broadcasting diversity 
is a product of its expertise, and we accord its judgment 
deference.”64Addressing the argument that the assumption that minority 
ownership will produce diverse viewpoints and programming was a 
stereotype, the Court noted: 
Rather, both Congress and the FCC maintain simply that expanded 
minority ownership of broadcast outlets will, in the aggregate, result in 
greater broadcast diversity. A broadcasting industry with representative 
minority participation will produce more variation and diversity than 
will one whose ownership is drawn from a single racially and 
ethnically homogeneous group.65 
The Court drew the following analogy between affirmative action 
jurisprudence and the diversification of media:  
Just as a “diverse student body” contributing to a “‘robust exchange of 
ideas’” is a “constitutionally permissible goal” on which a race-
conscious university admissions program may be predicated, the 
diversity of views and information on the airwaves serves important 
First Amendment values.66 
Furthermore, the Court noted that empirical evidence demonstrated that 
minority ownership influenced the selection of topics for news coverage 
and editorial views, especially when it came to matters of concern for 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. at 547.  
 60. Id. at 563. 
 61. Id. at 567.  
 62. Id. at 564–65 (internal citations omitted).  
 63. Id. at 566.  
 64. Id. at 570.  
 65. Id. at 579. 
 66. Id. at 568 (internal citations omitted). 
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minorities.67  
Although the majority decision in Metro Broadcasting upheld the 
FCC minority ownership policies, it was Justice O’Connor’s dissent that 
provided the framework for later cases reversing minority preferences and 
criticized the logic of the diversity rationale in broadcasting.68 Justice 
O’Connor believed the majority was departing from equal protection 
jurisprudence because any racial classification, regardless of whether it was 
deemed as benign, should be reviewed under strict scrutiny.69 She also 
disagreed with the majority’s assumption that individuals think a certain 
way because of their race.70 Justice O’Connor felt that the minority 
ownership programs provided benefits to some members of society while 
denying other members the same benefits based on the individual’s race or 
ethnicity, and that this process would lead to stigmatization of these groups 
because individuals would not be rewarded based on individual merit.71 
Furthermore, she noted that the FCC had not implemented these procedures 
as remedial measures for past discrimination and that they were not 
narrowly tailored to remedy identified discrimination.72 Ultimately, Justice 
O’Connor cast doubt on the assumption that diverse ownership would 
produce diverse viewpoints, therefore rejecting the nexus argument 
between an owner’s race and diverse programming.73   
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Metro Broadcasting effectively 
changed future analysis of minority preference programs. Her analysis 
provided the framework for the majority opinion in Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena,74 which held that all racial classifications, even benign ones 
imposed by government action, would trigger strict scrutiny.75 Although 
Adarand overruled the intermediate scrutiny standard of Metro 
Broadcasting, the permissibility of the diversity rationale of Metro 
Broadcasting was not addressed.76 However, later cases continued to cut 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. at 580–81.  
 68. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 32.  
 69. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602–03, 609–10 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“‘Strict scrutiny’ requires that, to be upheld, racial classifications must be determined to be 
necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.”). 
 70. Id. at 602–03. 
 71. Id. at 604.  
 72. Id. at 611–12 (“Under the appropriate standard, strict scrutiny, only a compelling 
interest may support the Government's use of racial classifications. Modern equal protection 
doctrine has recognized only one such interest: remedying the effects of racial 
discrimination. The interest in increasing the diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not 
a compelling interest.”). 
 73. Id. at 626–27.  
 74.  515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 75. Id. at 201–02. 
 76. See Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; see also Horwitz, supra note 5, at 35.  
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down the diversity rationale,77 and due to the lack of empirical evidence 
concerning the nexus between diverse ownership and diverse 
programming, minority ownership policies were seen “as violat[ing] [ ] the 
speech rights of corporations.”78 
C.  Furthering Consolidation: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
 and the FCC 2003 Report and Order  
Ownership limits have been used by the FCC to control media 
consolidation since the FCC’s inception; however, the last three decades 
have seen a relaxation of these ownership limits. A reason for this 
deregulation stemmed from the tremendous growth of media outlets in the 
1980s and 1990s due to technological changes, such as the advancement of 
cable television and direct broadcast satellite, which put economic stress on 
more traditional media like radio and broadcast television since they were 
competing for the same audience and advertisers.79 Because alternatives to 
more traditional media like broadcast television and radio were causing 
advertising dollars to shift to cable as cable is more efficient at providing 
advertisers with a more concentrated audience of a particular 
demographic,80 the FCC stepped in to ensure the viability of more 
traditional media by allowing multiple station ownership in order to 
produce “economies of scale that significantly reduce overhead.”81   
Between the 1950s and the enactment of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 (1996 Act), the landscape of ownership limits transformed 
tremendously:  
From 1954 to 1984, the FCC limited national ownership to seven 
stations, where each station was in a separate geographic market. In 
1984, the FCC expanded ownership limits to 12 stations, provided that 
the total number of stations owned did not reach over  25% of the 
national market. The 1996 Telecommunications Act raised the 
broadcast television ownership limit to 35% of the national market and 
                                                                                                                 
 77.  Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 354 (1998) (noting that 
even if the Court in Metro Broadcasting held that “the diversity interest was ‘important[,]’” 
the Lutheran Court did “not think diversity can be elevated to the ‘compelling’ level 
[required by the Adarand decision], particularly when the Court has given every indication 
of wanting to cut back Metro Broadcasting”); Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 
1027, 1052 (2002) (concluding that the FCC’s “diversity rationale for retaining the 
[Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership] Rule is woefully inadequate”).  
 78. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 38.  
 79. EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 17, 112. Also in the 1980s, television saw the addition of 
the first new network in fifty years with the Fox broadcast network. The addition of Fox and 
the growth of cable brought considerable competition for ABC, CBS, and NBC with strong 
competition not only from the growth of cable, but also from the formidable competitor Fox. 
Id. at 112.  
 80. Id. at 122.  
 81. Id. at 18.   
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eliminated the station ownership limit.82  
As a result of the relaxation in ownership limits, traditional broadcast 
networks began to buy and create cable networks in a horizontal integration 
strategy83 that resulted in massive consolidation of traditional and new 
technology in the media industry. This led companies like AOL/Time 
Warner Inc., The Walt Disney Company, and Viacom to become 
multinational media conglomerates that had their hand not only in 
broadcast and cable television, but also in the Internet, magazine, music, 
and retail industries.84  
The 1996 Act amended the Communications Act of 1934. With the 
passage of the 1996 Act, section 202(h) required that the FCC “review its 
media ownership rules biennially ‘to determine whether any of such rules 
are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition.’”85 In 2004, 
Congress amended the biennial review requirement in the 1996 Act so that 
reviews occur quadrennially and that the review does not include the 
national television multiple ownership review.86 The 1996 Act further 
provided that, in designing competitive bidding systems, the FCC would 
consider public interest objectives such as: 
promoting economic opportunity and competition and ensuring that 
new and innovative technologies are readily accessible to the 
American people by avoiding excessive concentration of licenses and 
by disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, 
including small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses 
owned by members of minority groups and women.87  
Although the language in the 1996 Act made it seem as if it were a 
proponent of minority ownership, the massive media consolidation 
resulting from the 1996 Act completely diminished whatever momentum 
previous minority ownership policies had established.  
The 1996 Act, coupled with the fact that the FCC abandoned policies 
such as the fourteen criteria ascertainment requirements and requirements 
for stations to keep program logs to determine whether community 
problems and issues were getting program coverage, resulted in lax 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Alexander & Cunningham, supra note 18, at 79. “Subsequently, the FCC’s decision 
in 2000 to retain a national broadcast television ownership limit was challenged by Fox 
Television Stations in the U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, and the Court reversed the 
FCC’s decision, sending the rule back to the FCC for further consideration.” Id. at 79–80.  
 83. EINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 128. 
 84. Id. at 138.  
 85. MARK LLOYD & PHIL NAPOLI, LOCAL MEDIA DIVERSITY MATTERS: MEASURE MEDIA 
DIVERSITY ACCORDING TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES, NOT MARKET VALUES 7 (2007), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/01/pdf/media_diversity.pdf (citing 2003 
Report and Order, supra note 12, at para. 56).  
 86. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–199, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 
97–98 (amending section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996).  
 87. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B) (2006).  
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standards that allowed major corporations to run amok.88 After the 1996 
Act was passed, the media industry saw dramatic consolidation with 
numerous mergers, acquisitions, and new partnerships resulting from 
relaxed ownership limits.89 Big Media companies like Clear Channel, 
Viacom, and Disney overtook small broadcasters and minority-owned 
stations.90 For those small broadcasters and minority-owned stations that 
already had licenses, the 1996 Act allowed “big companies [competing for 
the license[s]] [to drag] out the process to weed out the small players.”91 In 
addition, the consolidation began eliminating many workers in the 
communications industry.92  
All mediums in the industry saw their fair share of change. Perhaps 
one of the most notable examples of consolidation was in the radio industry 
with the rise of nationally syndicated conservative talk radio. Subsequent to 
the mergers resulting from a relaxation in ownership caps, nationally 
syndicated programming captivated the market, and conservative radio was 
one of the first genres to jump on the wagon.93 Since the 1996 Act 
eliminated national station ownership limits and raised local radio station 
ownership limits from four to eight, Big Media companies such as 
Cumulus Media, Viacom/Infinity, and Citadel Broadcasting Corporation 
joined Clear Channel in dominating the market.94 Within approximately 
two years after ownership limits were relaxed, Big Media companies 
bought and sold 4,400 stations out of the 10,400 commercial radio stations 
that existed at the time of the Act, which resulted in 700 radio owners 
losing their stations—a forty percent reduction in the number of radio 
owners.95 Television and cable also followed the radio model in 
consolidating the market and reducing the number of small and local 
broadcasters.96    
However, the story of ownership limits did not end with the 1996 Act. 
The FCC’s 2003 Report and Order further relaxed media ownership 
regulations.97 Included in the 2003 Report and Order were revisions to the 
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership rule, the radio-television cross-
                                                                                                                 
 88. See Byerly, supra note 36, at 2.  
 89. KLINENBERG, supra note 4, at 224. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 58. 
 92. Id. at 65. For instance, the union AFTRA, a “national labor union representing 
journalists, broadcasters, and artists, estimated that [Clear Channel] eliminated between 
1,500 and 4,500 positions between 2000 and 2004.” Id.  
 93. SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 4. 
 94. KLINENBERG, supra note 4, at 27.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 93, 209–10.  
 97. 2003 Report and Order, supra note 12. 
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ownership rule, the local television multiple ownership rule, the national 
television ownership cap, and the dual network rule.98 In effect, “the FCC 
increased the ownership limit to [forty-five percent] of the national 
market.”99 However, the controversy surrounding the relaxed ownership 
limits led Congress, in 2004, to step in and set a statutory limit on the 
national television ownership rules at thirty-nine percent.100  
Although the 2003 Report and Order served a blow to minority 
ownership with its relaxation of ownership regulation, the question of 
diversity was still on the table. The 2003 Report and Order noted that “[a] 
diverse and robust marketplace of ideas is the foundation of our 
democracy.”101 In analyzing diversity, the FCC noted five types of 
diversity: “viewpoint, outlet, program, source, and minority and female 
ownership diversity.”102 These types of diversity are part of media policy 
goals that try to achieve fundamental policy goals such as “a more effective 
and representative democratic process, economic efficiency, and greater 
participation of women and ethnic minorities in economic and political 
affairs.”103 The 2003 Report and Order stated, “[e]ncouraging minority and 
female ownership historically has been an important Commission 
objective, and we reaffirm that goal here.”104 Similar to the ownership 
policies of the 1970s, such as the 1978 Statement of Policy on Minority 
Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities,105 viewpoint diversity continued to 
be a concern as it would contribute to a better-informed citizenry—a 
“fundamental policy goal” of the FCC.106  
The FCC’s answer to the question of diversity was the development 
of the Diversity Index (DI).107 The DI was based on the Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index (HHI) used in antitrust enforcement to measure a firm’s 
market concentration for a specific good or service.108 Market 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. at para. 2 
 99. Alexander & Cunningham, supra note 18, at 80.  
 100. See id.; see also Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–199, § 
629, 118 Stat. 3, 97 (amending section 202 (c)(1)(B) of the Telecommunications Act of 
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 101. 2003 Report and Order, supra note 12, at para. 19.  
 102. Id. at para. 18. 
 103. Steven S. Wildman, Indexing Diversity, in MEDIA DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM: 
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 104. 2003 Report and Order, supra note 12, at para. 46 (internal citations omitted).  
  105. 1978 Statement of Policy, supra note 43.  
 106. Wildman, supra note 103, at 159.  
 107. 2003 Report and Order, supra note 12, at para. 391. Measuring diversity, although 
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 108. LLOYD & NAPOLI, supra note 85, at 8; see also Wildman, supra note 103, at 152. 
For an explanation of HHI mechanics, see Wildman, supra note 103, at 152–54.  
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concentration in the HHI is calculated by “taking the market share of each 
firm, squaring it, and then summing the result for all firms.”109 The DI was 
“to play a role in assessments of the effect of ownership structure on the 
performance of local media markets with respect to certain noneconomic 
policy goals analogous to that played by the HHI in antitrust 
enforcement.”110  
Similar to the HHI, the DI “is a measure of structure rather than a 
direct measure of performance with respect to a policy goal,” which 
demonstrates the “belief that ownership structure influences 
performance.”111 The FCC hoped that the DI would serve as an internal 
guide to assess viewpoint diversity while evaluating the status of local 
media markets and whether there should be further ownership 
consolidation of these markets.112 In using the DI, the FCC “define[s] a 
market, measure[s] concentration,” and defines reasons for “rejecting or 
accepting mergers.”113 In defining markets, the FCC “had to decide which 
media to include and how much weight they should be given.”114 
D.  Backlash to FCC Actions: Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal 
Communications Commission 
The 2003 Report and Order faced much criticism despite efforts to 
install the DI. What resulted was denouncement across the political 
spectrum, limitations enacted by Congress, and eventually the 2003 Report 
and Order was remanded for consideration by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit115 in Prometheus Radio Project v. Federal 
Communications Commission.116 The court noted that the FCC’s objective 
in setting licensing policies has “long acted on the theory that 
diversification of mass media ownership serves the public interest by 
promoting diversity of program and service viewpoints, as well as by 
preventing undue concentration of economic power.”117 However, the court 
found that the FCC had not “sufficiently justified its particular chosen 
numerical limits for local television ownership, local radio ownership, and 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Mark Cooper, When Law and Social Science Go Hand in Glove: Usage and 
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 110. Wildman, supra note 103, at 151.  
 111. Id. at 153.  
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Number 3] OVERWHELMED BY BIG CONSOLIDATION 749 
cross-ownership of media within local markets.”118  
The court remanded the 2003 Report and Order to the FCC because 
the FCC “gave too much weight to the Internet as a media outlet, 
irrationally assigned outlets of the same media type equal market shares, 
and inconsistently derived the Cross-Media Limits from its Diversity Index 
results.”119 The court noted that diversity comes from independent news 
sources and that it was inconsistent for the FCC to include the Internet in 
its DI but leave out cable television because most websites would not be 
considered independent news sources for local news any more than local 
news “retransmitted broadcast stations could be counted as cable-provided 
news.”120 In addition, the court found the assumption of equal market 
shares among all outlets within the same media type to be inconsistent with 
the FCC’s “overall approach to its Diversity Index and also makes 
unrealistic assumptions about media outlets’ relative contributions to 
viewpoint diversity in local markets.”121 The court pushed for the FCC to 
“measure media audiences, assess media usage, and apply a rigorous 
understanding of the function of media in democracy.”122  
In response to the backlash received with regard to its diversity 
efforts, the FCC engaged in numerous studies to analyze issues relating to 
market entry barriers that affect minority media owners, such as: licensing, 
programming, advertising, and access to capital.123 After various rounds of 
seeking comment, the FCC adopted the 2008 Broadcast Diversity Order.124 
The 2008 Broadcast Diversity Order adopted thirteen proposals to improve 
diversity efforts, such as the advertising nondiscrimination rule125 (also 
known as the ban on “no urban/no Spanish” dictates)126 and establishing 
policies that encourage growth of “eligible entities” that were to benefit 
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 120. Wildman, supra note 103, at 156; see also Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 
405–07.  
 121. Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.3d at 408. 
 122. Cooper, supra note 109, at 194.  
 123. Memorandum from the Minority Media and Telecomm. Council on the FCC’s 
Ability to Rely Upon Previous Adarand Studies to Henry M. Rivera, Chair, FCC Advisory 
Comm. on Diversity for Commun. in the Digital Age (May 5, 2009), 
http://www.fcc.gov/DiversityFAC/050709/adarand-status-050509.pdf (citation omitted). 
Examples of such studies may be found at Policy Forum on Market Entry Barriers, FCC 
CREATING OPPORTUNITIES (Dec. 12, 2000), http://www.fcc.gov/opportunity/meb_study/, and 
FCC Presented with Advertising Study Which Reveals a Tale of Two Systems, FCC, 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Informal/ad-study/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
 124. Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcast Services, Report and 
Order and Third Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 23 F.C.C.R. 5922 (2008) 
[hereinafter 2008 Broadcast Diversity Order]. 
 125.  Id. at paras. 49–50. 
 126. Id.  
750 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63 
under the Order (including reviving a distress sale policy and making rules 
encouraging investment in “eligible entities”).127 However, the FCC is still 
working on and seeking comment on new regulations that will help with 
implementing these proposals.128  
The consolidation of the media industry resulting from the 1996 Act 
and the FCC’s 2003 Report and Order changed the landscape for diversity 
in the media. Although the FCC has addressed the issue of diversity by 
establishing policies that promote minority ownership, minority owners 
have not been able to compete in this consolidated market. Regardless of 
whether one believes this has contributed to the lack of diverse 
programming serving minority audiences, this history shapes the diversity 
debate and the future of diversifying the media.  
III. THE FUTURE OF DIVERSITY IN THE MEDIA 
A.  Should We Have Diversity in Ownership of the Media? 
 The current status of media was illustrated by Josh Silver, executive 
director of Free Press: 
We now have a political system run by big money and a media 
controlled by big corporations that are happy to keep Americans 
uninformed about the bread-and-butter issues that affect us most. You 
can’t have democracy without an educated public, and you can’t have 
an educated public with the media ownership structure we have 
today.129 
As the 1978 Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting 
Facilities noted, minority ownership is important because it helps to 
“serve[] not only the needs and interests of the minority community but 
also enriches and educates the non-minority audience.”130 As Mr. Silver’s 
comment demonstrates, today’s broadcast media fall short of providing 
adequate programming to fulfill such an objective.  
For example, in the instance of broadcast and cable television, both 
are silent on issues regarding minority concerns and often engage in 
stereotypes of minorities in their program portrayals.131 Typically, news 
coverage concerning minorities is limited to certain activities or concerns, 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See id. at paras. 35–39. “Eligible entities” are defined as “any entity that would 
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and it often portrays minorities as “a threat or social burden” to society.132 
Studies demonstrate that “television news constrains White viewers’ 
perceptions and attitudes of minorities, and, more broadly, the policies and 
programs they are likely to support.” 133  
In addition, programming geared toward a minority audience has 
traditionally been very limited in broadcast and cable television. In 
broadcast television, the major networks have often shied away from more 
minority or urban programming.134 One potential reason for this is that 
networks traditionally want to produce less expensive programming that 
they can more likely syndicate.135 Although cable may be deemed to 
provide more options for all viewers, these options are considerably limited 
in number for minority viewers compared to the options of nonminority 
audiences, even on regular broadcast television.136 For example, “Black 
Entertainment Television (BET), which used to be a black-owned 
company,137 has primarily black-oriented programming, and has been 
criticized for mostly playing music videos . . . . and recycled sitcoms.”138 In 
addition, although Latinos are deemed to have more viewing options (like 
Univision and Telemundo) than African Americans, Latino viewing 
options are “often broadcast only in Spanish” (therefore excluding North 
American Latinos who do not speak Spanish) and that mergers in the 
industry have left “fewer Latino voices . . . on the air.”139  
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 136. See White Out, supra note 131, at 248.  
 137. Id. BET’s founder Robert Johnson sold BET to Viacom for $2 billion. Id.  
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 139. Id. at 249 (“In 2003, the FCC approved a merger between Univision and Hispanic 
Broadcasting. The deal created a Hispanic media conglomerate, which controls 63 of 65 
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Considering the current lack of minority programming, how can 
minority ownership ensure that programming formats provide viewpoint 
diversity to both minority and nonminority audiences? Although there is 
not a lot of empirical evidence concerning the nexus between minority 
ownership and broadcast diversity, some studies do indicate an increase in 
broadcast diversity when there is minority ownership of media in 
communities with larger minority populations.140 Studies demonstrate that 
minority ownership, especially in radio stations, differs in programming 
and in news focus from majority-owned stations.141 For instance, minority-
owned radio stations are more likely to choose program formats that 
provide news and public affairs programming that are of importance and 
concern to minority communities.142 For example, Black radio stations have 
been historically known to play an active role in community affairs and 
serve to unify African American audiences, especially in promoting 
political activism in the community and acting as a forum in critical social 
eras.143 Yet, studies also show that “the targeting of local programming to 
minority viewers is much greater in markets with larger minority 
populations.”144 
However, given Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Metro Broadcasting 
and her concern that we may be violating the Equal Protection Clause by 
making racial distinctions in regards to minority ownership policies, should 
we assume that just because one is a minority owner then he or she will 
broadcast information promoting diverse viewpoints? Although minority 
ownership does not guarantee diverse viewpoints, studies demonstrate that 
minority ownership rather “assure[s] the existence of a particular race-
based viewpoint on the part of the station owner, [and] what is in fact 
realized is a sensitivity to and appreciation for minority or ethnic 
preferences and viewpoints that allows for their articulation as part of the 
marketplace of ideas.”145 Although minority ownership does not guarantee 
diverse programming and sharing of diverse viewpoints, it does raise the 
likelihood of minority audiences being served.  
Even if the FCC were able to provide for more minority ownership in 
broadcast, would its regulations pass under the strict scrutiny standard for 
racial classifications advanced in Adarand? Legal logic from the 
affirmative action realm may be able to provide some guidance for this 
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problem. In Grutter v. Bollinger,146 the Supreme Court found that diversity 
is a compelling state interest when looking at “race-based governmental 
action in the context of equal protection jurisprudence.”147 Grutter, which 
involved higher education, held that “race may be a factor in admitting law 
students to promote diversity in the educational setting and better prepare 
students for the workforce . . . .”148  
Even though Grutter dealt with a state action, the diversity rationale 
of the Court has application to broadcast. Like promoting the diversity 
dialogue in schools, the diversity dialogue can be important to broadcast 
and in the marketplace of ideas.149 The diversity dialogue in higher 
education allows students to learn different viewpoints from one another. 
Likewise, increasing minority ownership also increases the pool of 
viewpoints in broadcast and allows for more ideas to be experienced by 
minority and nonminority audiences. The relationship between educational 
goals and broadcasting roles should be realized because “[b]roadcasting 
shapes cross-racial and ethnic understanding and may expose the American 
public to the existence of an increasingly diverse society and world.”150 
Therefore, this diversity logic from the affirmative action context should be 
utilized by the FCC in formulating minority ownership policies. 
Although minority ownership policies should not remain the sole 
focus of the FCC as a way to achieve more diverse programming, it is still 
an important policy that is currently being pursued by the FCC. The FCC’s 
Advisory Committee on Diversity for Communications in the Digital Age 
(Advisory Committee) formally recommended on October 14, 2010, that 
the FCC undergo a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to consider how to 
adopt a new preference program for its competitive bidding process in 
spectrum auctions.151 On December 2, 2010, Chairman Julius Genachowski 
released a Public Notice requesting comment based on the Advisory 
Committee’s recommendations.152 According to the Public Notice:  
Under the proposed preference, persons or entities who have overcome 
substantial disadvantage would be eligible for a bidding credit. The 
Advisory Committee explains that the new preference “would expand 
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the pool of designated entities to include those qualified applicants 
who have overcome substantial disadvantage,” noting that the 
proposed program is analogous in some respects to programs used by 
educational institutions in their admissions processes.153 
These designated entity rules from the proposals would benefit auction 
bidders who have “overcome a disadvantage, such as a disability or a 
minority or low-income background,” and “would thereby help to level the 
playing field.”154 In addition, as recognized by Commissioner Robert 
McDowell, the FCC is currently considering possibly replacing the 
“eligible entities” definition used in the 2008 Broadcast Diversity Order 
“with a new concept that more directly addresses race and gender 
classifications”; however, doing so “must satisfy the rigorous demands of 
the Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted under the Supreme Court’s 
Adarand line of cases.”155 
Although there is not strong empirical evidence that there is a direct 
link between minority ownership and diverse programming, minority 
ownership is believed to improve the likelihood of diverse programming in 
the aggregate. As the Court in Metro Broadcasting emphasized, we should 
defer to the FCC’s expertise on this matter and its historical belief that 
diverse media ownership does allow more ideas to be introduced into the 
marketplace of ideas. Diversified programming has traditionally been 
viewed by the FCC as a key objective of the Communications Act of 1934 
and the First Amendment, and we should defer to the FCC’s goals to 
enhance diversified programming through its minority ownership policies 
because of this tradition and historical belief. However, at the same time 
the FCC needs to expand its focus and introduce regulations that further 
improve the achievement of diverse programming.  
B.  Could the Internet Serve As a Substitute for Diverse 
 Programming? 
Although there are arguments that because of the Internet we have 
access to many diverse viewpoints at any given moment, the Internet can 
hardly serve as a substitute for diverse programming that will serve 
minority audiences. While diverse viewpoints may be more easily 
expressed through the Internet because of fewer barriers from pressures of 
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economic markets and Big Media companies, there are still barriers for 
minority audiences and for acquiring information of interest. Although 
broadband connection to the Internet in the home has increased from ten 
percent in 2000 to over eighty percent in 2009, web users’ confidence in 
the reliability of the Internet has declined from fifty-five percent in 2000 to 
thirty-nine percent in 2009.156 In addition, there are still problems of 
computer literacy, which lead to “exacerbat[ing] inequalities among 
American communities.”157 Therefore, until problems of reliability and 
computer literacy are remedied, diverse viewpoints will have a difficult 
time reaching minority and nonminority audiences who may not have 
computer literacy or Internet access.   
In addition, the Internet, although an expansive source, can be 
described as the “antilocal medium” because it connects us to places far 
away.158 The Internet is largely dominated by Big Media that recycles its 
broadcast and news sources on their websites, which are relied upon by 
other websites for information:159 
The majority of online news content consists of repackaged wire 
service articles and syndicated newspaper stories, and most daily 
newspapers use the Web primarily to republish print articles rather 
than offering interactive or multimedia products. New media giants 
such as Yahoo, AOL, and IBS rely almost entirely on news supplied by 
other organizations, while bland, brief stories from wire services such 
as the Associated Press and Reuters constitute about three-fourths of 
the content at ABC.com and three-fifths of the content at both Fox.com 
and MSNBC.com.160 
Although there is greater information available at our fingertips on the 
Internet, “[o]nline diversity is astonishingly shallow.”161 Because of the 
problem of reliability on the Internet, people typically prefer news 
companies that have proven themselves, which usually means “old media” 
news companies.162 Since web users often use just a few successful sites, 
this makes it more difficult for diverse viewpoints to be explored.163 
 While technology could potentially better serve minority audiences, 
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it has yet to prove itself. Computer literacy and Internet access remain 
barriers for minority audiences, and the Internet remains limited in 
providing various reliable sources. Even though we as a society should 
promote education in all communities to learn how to use new technologies 
as they become available, we should not wait on a future technology to be 
our saving grace. Technology should not be used to deflect the 
insufficiency of other media to serve minority audiences and to produce 
diverse programming.  
C.  Bringing Back Regulation and Implications of the Fairness 
 Doctrine 
Traditionally, there have been two main approaches to achieving 
diversity in the media: an open market approach and a regulatory 
approach.164 However, the consolidation of the media industry in the last 
three decades demonstrates that the market approach has not served 
minority audiences and the ability to create more diverse programming. 
Therefore, the FCC needs to bring back a regulatory approach that focuses 
not only on ownership but also on the standards of programming and how 
that programming is brought to fruition by means other than strictly 
advertising.  
The market approach, which is the approach the FCC has adopted 
primarily in the last three decades, stands for the efficient use of market 
forces to create diverse voices in media and society by allowing media 
companies to compete and determine the amount of programming desired 
by the market.165 Efficiency in the market results by allowing media 
companies to be free from government regulation so that they may create 
diverse choices as the market demands it.166 In order to obtain efficiency, 
media companies have structured themselves into vertically integrated 
organizations, which allow them to achieve scale economies because “costs 
can be amortized over many products rather than a single product.”167 In 
addition, “economies of scope168 are achieved when a company produces 
multiple products that are in some way compatible,” such as selling DVDs 
and books that complement television shows produced by a media 
company.169 Achieving economies of scope allows Big Media companies to 
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“produc[e] similar content over many forms[,]” which allows them to 
“more efficiently produce a profit.”170 
Opponents of a strict market approach argue that by media companies 
organizing in vertically integrated structures, it makes it more difficult for 
new media competitors to enter the competitive market because “[m]ultiple 
stage entry is always more costly, difficult, and risky than single stage 
entry.”171 Therefore, the vertical integration structure leads to a few 
corporations, or “media monopolies,” dominating the marketplace and 
“restricting marketplace diversity” by denying access to different 
viewpoints.172  
The regulatory approach proposes that government regulation is the 
only way to promote social needs such as creating diversity.173 If left 
strictly to the market, “pro-social programming” would not be created 
because private companies would not want to risk their ability to make a 
profit over working toward the public interest.174 Since the broadcast 
system is based on advertising, which is determined by the size of the 
audience, producers create programs that will appeal to a majority 
audience.175 As a result, in order to achieve the largest possible audience, 
programming will not account for “minority tastes.”176 The reason this is a 
problem for achieving diversity in media is because multinational 
corporations that depend on other multinational corporations (advertisers) 
for profits are the ones that decide what will be communicated to 
audiences.177  
The FCC has used ownership regulation as a way to regulate content. 
However, with the deregulation of media, ownership caps have expanded 
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and have essentially barred the ability of smaller program producers to 
enter media. Even if minority owners were able to break through the barrier 
of vertically integrated companies, they would still face barriers produced 
by advertisers because advertisers place limits on the type of programming 
to be produced.178 Perhaps the solution is in reaching programming. 
Although regulating programming runs the risk of violating the First 
Amendment, examples from other countries demonstrate that democracies 
have been able to require certain percentages of programming instead of 
requiring specific content. For instance, Western European countries have 
regulated the percentage of cultural, educational, and entertainment 
programming.179 “In the Netherlands, 25% of programming is dedicated to 
culture, 25% to information, 25% to entertainment, and 5% to 
education.”180 Likewise, Ireland requires radio stations to have news and 
current affairs comprise 20% of their programming.181 The only example in 
the United States where content has been mandated is in the Children’s 
Television Act, which enabled the FCC to require that three hours of 
children’s programming be made available on the public airwaves.182  
Broadcasters are viewed as public trustees because they impact public 
airwaves with their broadcast license.183 Since broadcasters are required to 
serve the public interest, we may view programming obligations as part of 
public rights.184 Many view pro-society programming as the type of 
programming that is often on public television, such as “children’s 
programming, public affairs programming, arts programming, 
documentaries, [and] nature programming.”185 Although public television 
does provide more pro-society programming compared to broadcast 
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network and cable networks, public television faces “increasing costs, 
increasing competition from cable networks and decreasing public 
spending.”186 Therefore, public television has come to rely on advertisers in 
the same way as for-profit broadcasters in order to supplement public funds 
it receives and funds from individual subscribers.187 Because all media 
producers rely on this method of financing its programs, the FCC should 
reinstate its ascertainment requirements. By laying out specific standards 
for programming, such as the FCC did previously with the fourteen criteria 
ascertainment requirements in the 1960s, broadcasters will be required to 
serve communities’ needs and include the interests of minority audiences in 
their programming decisions while lessening the pressures of advertisers to 
dictate the content of programming.  
If the FCC were to proceed with regulations promoting more diverse 
programming to serve minority audiences, such as ascertainment 
requirements, then concerns might arise that the FCC would be doing so in 
order to push certain viewpoints in broadcasting. Such regulations may 
bring about concerns about a resurgence of the Fairness Doctrine. Despite 
assertions by President Obama and FCC Commissioner Michael Copps that 
they do not support reinstating the Fairness Doctrine,188 conservative 
politicians and critics—fearing that the Obama Administration and 
Congress would reinstate the Fairness Doctrine in order to contain 
conservative talk radio—introduced bills in both houses to keep the 
Fairness Doctrine from reemerging.189 On February 26, 2009, the Senate 
voted to ban the reinstatement of the Fairness Doctrine by adding a rider—
“S.Amdt. 573: To prevent the Federal Communications Commission from 
repromulgating the fairness doctrine”—to the D.C. Voting Rights Bill: 
Broadcaster Freedom Act.190 These efforts demonstrate that the Fairness 
Doctrine is not likely to return.  
                                                                                                                 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 3–4; see White House: Obama Opposes 
‘Fairness Doctrine’ Revival, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 18, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/first100days/2009/02/18/white-house-opposes-fairness-
doctrine/ (noting that White House spokesman Ben LaBolt told FoxNews.com, “As the 
president stated during the campaign, he does not believe the Fairness Doctrine should be 
reinstated”); Matt Cover, Acting FCC Chair Sees Government Role in Pushing ‘Media 
Diversity,’ CNSNEWS.COM (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/43414 
(stating that Copps believed the Fairness Doctrine “didn’t need to be rehashed”). 
 189. SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 3; see, e.g., Broadcaster Freedom Act of 2009, 
S. 34, 111th Cong. (2009); Broadcaster Freedom Act of 2009, S. 62, 111th Cong. (2009); 
Broadcaster Freedom Act of 2009, H.R. 226, 111th Cong. (2009).  
 190. S. 160: District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-160&tab=amendments (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2011). 
760 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63 
Although President Obama and Commissioner Copps stated they 
opposed the Fairness Doctrine, both have made statements regarding the 
need for media diversity. For instance, President Obama, as a then-acting 
Senator, wrote a joint article with Senator John Kerry that stated, “As we 
look toward the future, we must ensure that all voices in our diverse nation 
have the opportunity to be heard. One important way to do this is to expand 
the ownership stake of women-owned, minority-owned and small 
businesses in our media outlets. . . . The FCC has an obligation to promote 
the public interest, including diversity in media ownership.”191 
Commissioner Copps, formerly acting as Chairman, stated that he believed 
the government has a role in enforcing media diversity.192 In a speech to the 
Future of Music Coalition, Commissioner Copps stated that in order “to 
ensure that the public airwaves truly deliver the kind of news and 
information that we need to sustain our democratic dialogue and to reflect 
the great diversity of our country [we need] to make sure that these goals . . 
. remain at the center [of] the national agenda.”193 In response to the 
“excessive” media consolidation, Commissioner Copps noted a more 
regulatory approach may be needed:  
Sometimes . . . markets create problems, and boy have they created 
some whoppers this time . . . . Sometimes we need the government to 
step in and provide some oversight and some public accountability and 
if we learn one lesson from our present national crisis, that ought to be 
it.194 
Commissioner Copps further stated, “[i]f markets cannot produce what 
society really cares about, like a media that reflects the true diversity and 
spirit of our country, then government has a legitimate role to play.”195 
In response to the role that government must play in expanding media 
diversity, the Senate adopted the Durbin Amendment.196 Proposed by 
Senator Durbin, it was adopted by Senate Amendment 591 to the D.C. 
House Voting Rights Act (S.160).197 The amendment states that the FCC 
“shall take action to encourage and promote diversity in communication 
media ownership.”198 
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Critics claim this is promoting a new Fairness Doctrine.199 
Republicans worry that the broad language of the amendment will lead to 
the implementation of the Fairness Doctrine later in time.200 On the other 
hand, Democrats counter that the amendment does not mention the Fairness 
Doctrine, and it would work to ensure that those with a broadcast license 
work to promote the public interest.201  
It seems very unlikely that the Fairness Doctrine will make a return; 
however, this does not mean that the promotion of diversity in the 
communications industry should be completely abandoned. In addition, 
changing media ownership rules to reflect more diversity does not 
constitute censorship.  
Since the very beginning of broadcast regulation, the FCC has 
maintained limits on the number of stations one company may own in 
a local community and the number they may own nationally, to ensure 
diversity. While media companies would prefer to get larger, there is 
no plausible argument that ownership limits censor content.”202 
The onslaught of media deregulation and court rulings has led to a 
media industry dominated by big business and the survival of the fittest (or 
those with the deepest pockets) in an economic market. So what chance 
does diverse programming have in this grim reality? In order to ensure the 
role of diversity in the communications industry, the government must take 
a stronger role in its promotion. Policies advancing minority ownership 
should continue to be promoted. In addition, since diverse programming 
has difficulty thriving because it must compete in economically demanding 
markets in which advertisers and Big Media rule the roost, regulation 
should focus on changing the means of financing ownership. The broadcast 
industry’s reliance “on advertising for its financial support” (especially that 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Matt Cover, Durbin: ‘Right-Wing’ Radio Hosts Wave ‘Bloody Shirt’ over 
Broadcast Censorship, CNSNEWS.COM (Mar. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/44895; see also, e.g., Seton Motley, Essay: The 
Durbin Amendment–The New ‘Fairness’ Doctrine with a Kicker, NEWSBUSTERS.ORG (Feb. 
27, 2009), http://newsbusters.org/blogs/seton-motley/2009/02/27/essay-durbin-amendment-
new-fairness-doctrine-kicker; Jim DeMint, TWITTER (Feb. 26, 2009, 11:43 AM), 
http://twitter.com/JimDeMint/status/1254977388 (quoting a tweet by Republican Senator 
Jim DeMint of South Carolina, who proposed a counter amendment to the Durbin 
Amendment, “We have closed the front door on Fairness Doctrine, but Durbin amend opens 
back door to censorship. The fight goes on”); Conn Carroll, Morning Bell: The Durbin 
Doctrine’s Assault on Free Speech, FOUNDRY: CONSERVATIVE POL’Y NEWS BLOG (Mar. 16, 
2009, 8:07 AM), http://blog.heritage.org/2009/03/16/morning-bell-the-durbin-doctrine-
assault-on-free-speech/ (stating that Senator Durbin “knows that reinstating the old Fairness 
Doctrine is a non-starter so he has come up with a new but equally pernicious law that will 
accomplish the exact same thing”). 
 200. SENATUS, supra note 196. 
 201. Id.  
 202. SILVER & AMMORI, supra note 24, at 6.  
762 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63 
of television) has been argued to “lead[] to limited diversity.”203 In order to 
expand minority ownership and diversity, “we need a more mixed system 
of mass media with different mandates and different modes of 
financing.”204 Finally, rather than allow advertisers to dictate content, the 
FCC needs to bring back regulation that promotes diverse programming, 
such as ascertainment requirements, so that broadcasters have standards for 
serving minority audiences like they serve their nonminority audiences.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
A high-ranking studio executive once noted, “It’s an awfully white 
world on television.”205 This “awfully white world” aptly describes the 
landscape of today’s American media. The current state of American media 
reflects the interests of Big Media corporations who rule the audience’s 
intake of information. Despite the fallacy that we have more information in 
a constantly developing technological age, much of the information we 
acquire consists of condensed and recycled stories. In a democracy that 
relies on having an informed public, how can we truly feel informed when 
we have to rely on a handful of major media companies to send the 
information to us in as many mediums as they can reach us? By bringing 
back regulation, the FCC can ensure the public interest is served and that 
minority audiences are not continuously neglected.  
The evolution of diversity in media has seen many highs and many 
lows, but at the moment it seems stagnant. With the FCC’s 1978 Statement 
of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, we saw the 
potential for the advancement of minority ownership in broadcast as a way 
of promoting diversity in the marketplace of ideas. However, after Supreme 
Court decisions in Metro Broadcasting and Adarand, we saw the Court 
limiting government action that would be deemed to be providing benefits 
due to racial classifications. Furthermore, the opportunity for minority 
ownership seemed to be further slashed by the unprecedented media 
consolidation that resulted from relaxed ownership regulations by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the FCC’s 2003 Report and Order. 
Although the FCC attempted to provide a Diversity Index that would assist 
in measuring local markets and their ability to put out diverse viewpoints, 
the Diversity Index has been deemed an insufficient remedy in the wake of 
Prometheus Radio Project. In response, the FCC adopted the 2008 
Broadcast Diversity Order, but we have yet to see full implementation of 
the proposals adopted to assist minority media owners.  
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The FCC needs to bring back regulation. Rather than allow a handful 
of major companies to dominate the content received by our local 
audiences, the FCC should continue to focus on minority media ownership. 
As of 2005, “only 3.6 percent of all broadcast radio and television stations 
were minority-owned, while a mere 3.4 percent were owned by women.”206 
Although it is not guaranteed that minority ownership will always result in 
diverse programming, we should defer to the FCC’s long standing history 
in believing it will improve the likelihood of diverse programming in the 
aggregate.  
Media policies promoting minority ownership should continue, but 
they should not be the only way to achieve diverse programming. Rather, 
the FCC should also consider regulations that focus on programming itself, 
such as bringing back ascertainment requirements, as a way to control how 
programming is determined. Although developing technologies, such as the 
Internet, could serve minority audiences, many barriers still exist that keep 
this technology from being used to its full potential. In order to ensure that 
the needs of all audiences are served, the FCC needs to lay out standards 
for broadcasters so that they meet the needs of their communities. Only by 
looking to the communities broadcasters serve can programming become 
diversified and reflect interests that are inclusive of minority audiences as 
well as nonminority audiences.  
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